Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 3

1992

Article 11

Valentine Korah & Warwick A. Rothnie,
Exclusive Distribution and the EEC
Competition Rules: Regulations 1983/83 &
1984/83
Peter Alexiadis∗

∗

Copyright c 1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Valentine Korah & Warwick A. Rothnie,
Exclusive Distribution and the EEC
Competition Rules: Regulations 1983/83 &
1984/83
Peter Alexiadis

Abstract
The second edition of Exclusive Distribution is, quite frankly, an indispensable source when
reviewing the compatibility of exclusive distribution agreements with Article 85 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (the “EEC Treaty”). Its indispensability lies, in
part, in the fact that distribution issues comprise the vast bulk of an EEC competition practitioner’s
ongoing antitrust work. The provision of exclusive territories, or the promise to purchase on an
exclusive basis are, in turn, the most popular forms of distribution arrangement used in the EEC.
The indispensability also lies in the fact that the book manages to cover almost every conceivable
problem area that could arise in practice. It is a constant source of satisfaction to the reviewer to
be able to turn to the second edition of Exclusive Distribution and find that what he considered to
be a novel question is already canvassed at length.

BOOK REVIEWS
EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATIONS 1983/83 & 1984/83. By Valentine Korah and Warwick A. Rothnie. Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 2d ed. 1992. xxxvii + 377 pp. ISBN 0-421-458 704. UK £58 + P&P.
Reviewed by Peter Alexiadis *
Disproving the oft-touted notion that the dominant market player has a tendency to become "idle" if not challenged
by new market entrants,' Professor Korah, the undisputed
market leader in the world of European Economic Community
("EEC") competition law monographs,2 has launched a new
model. The new model replaces what had been her successful
first edition of Exclusive Distribution and EEC Competition Rules'
("Exclusive Distribution"), published in 1984. The old model's
success, however, was probably due as much to its early penetration of the market as to its quality. Indeed, the first edition
of Exclusive Distribution, being the first of her monographs, was
arguably the weakest product in Professor Korah's diverse
product range.4
* Attorney, Coudert Brothers, Brussels.

1. Referred to as the "quiet life" in CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD,
COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 87, § 8-063 (Supp. 3d ed., 1991). Accepted

in part by implication in the treatment of public monopolies under EEC law; see
Porto de Genova v. Siderurgica Gabriella, Case C-179/90 (Ct. First Instance, December 10, 1991) (not yet reported).
2. On the basis of the judgment of the European Court of Justice in AKZO
Chemie v. Commission, Case C-62/86 (Eur. Ct.J., July 3, 1991) (not yet reported), a
market share of 50% will usually be presumed to constitute a position of market
dominance.
3. Compare VALENTINE KORAH & WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION
AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 1983/83 & 1984/83 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION] with VALENTINE KORAH, EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES (1984).
4. VALENTINE KORAH, EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990); VALENTINE KORAH, EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS IN THE EEC: REGULATION 1983/83
AND 1984/83 (1984) (2d ed. 1992); VALENTINE KORAH, FRANCHISING AND THE EEC
COMPETITION RULES, REGULATION 4087/88 (1989); VALENTINE KORAH, KNOW-HOW LiCENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES, REGULATION 556/89
(1989); VALENTINE KORAH & WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, R & D AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES-REGULATION 418/85 (1986); VALENTINE KORAH, PATENT LICENSING AND
EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 2349/84 (1985); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPETI-
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A wealth of administrative practice by the Commission of
the European Communities (the "Commission") and a number
of important judgments in the distribution field by the European Court of Justice (the "Court of Justice") in the intervening years meant that the first edition was seen by other potential competitors as a model that had outlived its "sell by" date.
Consequently, a number of new market entrants appeared.
With the release of her second edition, however, Professor
Korah has regained her ascendancy as the primary source for
EEC competition law relating to distribution practices. She
has done so through a combination of factors, the most important of which has been her recruitment of the services of a joint
venture partner, Warwick A. Rothnie. Mr. Rothnie has not
only added valuable research & development ("R & D") to the
second edition, but has also assisted greatly in the improvement of its argumentation, readability, and presentation.
Where the work of one joint venturer starts and that of the
other ends is at times difficult to discern.5 What is manifestly
clear, however, is that the second edition of Exclusive Distribution is the most lucid, clear, and practice-oriented of all of Professor Korah's monographs. A decided improvement is that
the second edition no longer has the "stream of consciousness" aura that characterized certain parts of the first edition.
Indeed, the second edition of Exclusive Distribution has, in a very
short time, established itself as the standard text on distribution practices for EEC competition law practitioners in Brussels. There is no doubt that EEC lawyers in the United Kingdom, in addition to U.S. lawyers with an EEC law practice, will
hold similar views. The degree of innovation between the first
and second editions of Exclusive Distribution may indeed cause
difficulties for Professor Korah because the release of the second edition may be viewed in many circles as erecting insurmountable barriers to entry for Professor Korah's competiTION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA (contributing author on U.K. competi-

tion law).
5. The more astute reader will be aware that, for the purposes of EEC law, different legal regimes apply for the appraisal of joint ventures depending upon
whether they are characterized as being concentrative or cooperative. Although this
distinction is immaterial in the present context, the Korah/Rothnie collaboration
would appear to be cooperative in nature, as neither of the joint venture partners has
otherwise withdrawn from the market individually.
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The second edition of Exclusive Distribution is, quite frankly,
an indispensable source when reviewing the compatibility of
exclusive distribution agreements with Article 85 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (the "EEC
Treaty"). 7 Its indispensability lies, in part, in the fact that distribution issues comprise the vast bulk of an EEC competition
practitioner's ongoing antitrust work. The provision of exclusive territories, or the promise to purchase on an exclusive basis are, in turn, the most popular forms of distribution arrangement used in the EEC. The indispensability also lies in the fact
that the book manages to cover almost every conceivable problem area that could arise in practice. It is a constant source of
satisfaction to the reviewer to be able to turn to the second
edition of Exclusive Distribution and find that what he considered
to be a novel question is already canvassed at length. To the
extent that the book does not do so, Professor Korah would no
doubt appreciate a short note indicating what point has not
been covered.
At least so far as non-EEC specialists are concerned, perhaps a bird's-eye view of the relevant EEC competition rules
that apply in a distribution context is advisable. An understanding of the basic manner in which these rules operate is, in
the view of the reviewer, necessary to better appreciate the
value of Exclusive Distribution. Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty
prohibits all manner of agreement the intention or effect of
which is a restriction of competition.8 Article 85(1) is the European Community equivalent to section 1 of the Sherman
Act.9 It is not, however, interpreted in a like manner to its U.S.
counterpart. Pursuant to Article 85(2) of the EEC Treaty, an
infringement of the prohibition in Article 85(1) results in the
automatic nullity of the offending provision in a distribution
6. Although in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), it was upheld that a market player with a
large market share may be aggressive in its development of new products even
though this may render smaller firms less competitive.
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 1 (1958), amended by Single
European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [treaty as amended hereinafter referred to as EEC Treaty].
8. See EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 85(1).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
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agreement and possibly even the agreement in its entirety (depending upon the respective national laws that determine
whether or not the offending provision is severable). This
means that a supplier cannot enforce a provision that falls foul
of Article 85(1) in a national EC Member State court.
The sanction of nullity would not pose an intractable
problem if Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty were interpreted in
a flexible manner similar to the rule of reason approach under
U.S. antitrust law. Unfortunately, a policy toward vertical restraints similar to that taken in Continental TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 'o has not yet found favor with the EC Commission.
Instead, the Commission has, by and large, adopted a very formalistic approach in determining what constitutes a "restriction" of competition. The inevitable consequence of this approach is that many obligations imposed by a supplier on its
exclusive distributor constitute a technical infringement of Article 85(1), even though their net effect is the promotion of
inter-brand competition. By way of example, the mere grant of
exclusivity, save in exceptional circumstances,"I is said to constitute a technical restriction of competition contrary to Article
85(1). The relevant restriction of competition is said to lie in
the fact that a supplier has denied himself the ability to appoint
further distributors.
The policy basis for such a prima facie counter-intuitive
approach is twofold. First, the Commission's enforcement
agenda in the field of distribution is as much influenced by its
desire to forge a true internal market as it is by pure competition concerns. As was explained by the Commission in 1983,
these various forms of distribution and the relationships
they involve pose less problems in a large, integrated and
highly competitive market like that of the United States than
in a large market that has not yet attained a very high degree of integration of its commerce like the European Coin10. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. See Socit6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65,
[1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357 (exclusivity necessary to penetrate a new
geographic market); Coditel SA v. Cin6 Vog Films SA, Case 262/81, [1982] E.C.R.
3381 (absolute territorial protection permissible in relation to copyright in performing rights); Erauw-Jacquery SPRL v. La Hesbignonne SC, Case 27/87, [1988] E.C.R.
1919, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576 (exclusivity granted in relation to plant breeders' rights
in basic seed).
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The natural consequence of this concern is that the Commission devotes more time to the prohibition of restrictions affecting intra-brand competition than it does with respect to interbrand competition. Secondly, the Commission was concerned
in the formative stages of the Community to assert its antitrust
jurisdiction, partially as a reflection of the fact that, aside from
Germany, there were no effective domestic antitrust regimes
operating in the EEC at the time. For better or worse, until the
internal market has become a reality and until the principle of
subsidiarity in competition law matters is fleshed out, these enforcement priorities will continue.
The rather formalistic approach taken by the Commission
on the notion of a "restriction" of competition has been to
some extent counterbalanced by the liberal use of its powers of
3
individual exemption under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.1
Under Article 85(3) the Commission can, upon satisfaction of a
number of pro-competitive factors, exempt agreements from
the Article 85(1) prohibition.14 Exempted agreements can
thereafter be enforced in Member State courts. Article 85(3)
reflects, for all intents and purposes, a truncated rule of reason
approach that is applied only ex post facto upon an infringement of Article 85(1). In one of the greater contradictions of
EEC law, the very obligation that is held by the Commission to
be "not necessary," and hence a technical infringement of Article 85(1), can nevertheless be found to be "indispensable"
and hence worthy of an individual exemption under Article
85(3).
The problem with this approach is that because only the
Commission has the legal power to grant an exemption, all requests for exemption must be made to the Commission itself,
rather than to the antitrust authorities or courts of a Member
State. This process, given the limited resources of the Commission is, for all practical purposes, unworkable from a commercial point of view. Consequently, the Commission has
12.

COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

25 (1983).

13. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, at 35-36, § 2.1; see EEC Treaty, supra

note 7, art. 85(3).
14. See EEC Treaty, supra note 7.
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needed to adopt a series of "Block" Exemption Regulations.'Under these Block Exemptions, certain types of commonly
used agreements are deemed to be automatically exempt, and
hence do not require notification under Article 85(3) of the
EEC Treaty, if they fulfill the formal requirements of these
Block Exemption Regulations.
The most commonly used block exemptions relate to exclusive distribution agreements (where a supplier grants an exclusive territory to a dealer) and to exclusive purchasing agreements (where a dealer promises to buy the full amount of its
requirements in the contract goods from the supplier, but has
not been granted an exclusive territory). 6 The second edition
of Exclusive Distribution focuses primarily upon these "Block"
Exemption Regulations and explains how business people and
their legal advisors can draft their agreements so as to fit
within their terms.' 7 As hardened EC counsel will explain, this
is the only means by which commercial persons can be guaranteed a very high degree of legal certainty that their agreements
are unimpeachable under EEC antitrust rules.
Exclusive Distribution is, then, first and foremost, a legal
guide as to how to conform with the rigors of the relevant
Block Exemption Regulations. In doing so, its authors embark
upon an exhaustive analysis of the strict terms of the Regulations, as supplemented by the Commission's own interpretive
Notice on both Regulations.' 8 Wherever possible, recourse is
made to informal Commission administrative practice that
sheds light upon the interpretation of the Regulations. The
presentation of the individual provisions of the Regulations
side-by-side with the appropriate comment from the Commission's Notice is, in the mind of this reviewer, a particularly effective means for treating this area of the law. In what has now
15. See EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, at 35-36, § 2.1, 59-60, § 3.1.
16. See Commission Regulation No. 1983/83, O.J. L 173/1 (1983) on the application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution
agreements, amended by Oj. L 281/24 (1983); see also Commission Regulation No.
1984/83, O.J. L 173/5 (1983), correctedversion in O.J. L 281/24 (1983), on the application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements.
17. See EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, at 59-97, §§ 3.1-3.27.
18. Commission Notice concerning Commission Regulations No. 1983/83, No.
1984/83, Oj. C 101/2 (1984) on the application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty
to categories of exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing agreements.
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become a "Korahesque" shorthand means of designating
which types of provisions benefit from the terms of a Block Exemption Regulation, the notion of "whitelisted" and "blacklisted" clauses is used to designate what is acceptable and what
is not.' 9 This jargon has become so all-pervasive over the last
decade that even the members of the Commission itself refer
to these clauses by these noms des plumes. It should be noted
that the Commission is not averse to creating its own jargon.
In what must be the quintessence of compromise between the
need to preserve the integrity of the internal market and commercial realities, the Commission has sought to differentiate
between the notion of "passive" and "active" sales, and has
determined that the restrictions, which may or may not apply
to either type of sale, vary.20
So far, so good. What happens, however, if business people are not interested in straight-jacketing their distribution
agreements to conform strictly to the terms of Regulations
1983/83 or 1984/83? The second function of Exclusive Distribution is to explore the fundamental thinking of both the Court
ofJustice and the Commission regarding distribution practices
as a means of permitting business people to evaluate the risks
of not falling within the terms of the appropriate Block Exemption Regulation. This is not a simple task, particularly when
one considers that EEC competition law is ridiculously fragmented, with different legal regimes applying for selective distribution, 2 ' franchising, 22 agency, exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing, and the special regime available for automobile distribution.2 3 The degree of fragmentation is a reflection
of the fact that the Commission has formulated its rules in the
distribution field in an ad hoc manner in response to new
19. See generally EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, at 127-48, § 5.1-5.11.

20. See id. at 99-125, § 4.1-4.5.
21. Id. at 254-70, § 10.1-10.8. "Selective distribution" is the term used in Community law to describe distribution systems whereby the supplier, usually a brand
owner, limits the number of kinds of dealers whom he will permit to resell his products and requires that his dealers should sell only to end users or other approved
dealers.
22. Id. at 284-87, § 11.4-11.5; see Block Exemption Regulation No. 4087/88,
OJ. L 359/46 (1988) on the application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to categories of franchise agreements.
23. Commission Regulation No. 123/85, O.J. L 15/16 (1985) on the application
of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle and distribution and servicing agreements.
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methods of marketing in the Community. Arguing by analogy
with all these other legal rules may not provide absolute legal
comfort to those whose agreements fall outside the four corners of a particular Block Exemption Regulation, 2 4 but it is
nevertheless of invaluable assistance in lessening legal risks
and diminishing the severity of any administrative fines that
may be imposed by the Commission. It should not be forgotten that the pros and cons of these alternative methods of distribution are usefully compared with the principal focus of the
book's attention-exclusive distribution.
Exclumive Distribution is also a very useful book because it
differentiates clearly for the reader the nuances in legal interpretation as between the Commission and the Court of Justice. 25 The importance of this distinction in practice is often
forgotten in other texts that tend to treat the jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice and the administrative practice of the
Commission as a unified whole, which clearly they are not.
The authors also provide an interesting critique of the
Commission's administrative practice in the field of distribution generally. 26 This critique is useful for practitioners keen
on defending their legal positions in the context of a Commission investigation. It is also instructive to members of the
Commission itself. It is well known within the Commission
that Professor Korah has a number of her admirers working
within its walls and her line of argument occasionally surfaces
in the text of a published Commission decision. The criticisms
are found sporadically throughout the text, but the authors
have seen fit to distill most of their trenchant criticisms
through the combined effect of chapters one and nine. Pleas
for a more ex ante, as opposed to an ex post, orientation in the
Commission's thinking have fallen on deaf ears in the past.
24. For example, it has become clear in the course of separate investigations
into the agricultural machinery sector (Commission Press Release, IP (90) 917 (November 16, 1990)), and into the motorcycle sector (Honda, Commission Press Release, IP (92) 544 (July 3, 1992)) that distribution agreements in those sectors cannot
benefit by analogy from the terms of Regulation 123/85. In Ford Agricultural, OJ. L
20/1 (1993) L 20/1, however, the EC Commission, in deciding to waive the imposition of administrative fines, did take into account the fact that the defendants were of
the view that their interference with sales to authorized dealers was justified under
Regulation 123/85.
25. See EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, at 51-53, § 2.9.
26. Id. at 243-50, § 9.1-9.6.
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There are signs, however, that Professor Korah's exhortations
are finding greater favor with those who shape policy decisions. In fact, if the Commission's avowed policy of decentralizing EEC competition law so that it is administered in the
Member States rather than in Brussels is to have any meaning,
much of the reasoning pioneered in Exclusive Distribution will
need to be followed in the future, whether by design or by default. If national authorities are to play a constructive role in
the enforcement of EEC competition rules, the system cannot
go on indefinitely finding that everything contravenes Article
85(1) and requires Article 85(3) exemption. As mentioned
earlier, it is only the Commission that has the power to grant
an individual exemption. 7 Having said this, the reviewer
notes with some satisfaction that, in putting forth his criticisms
of the second edition of Exclusive Distribution, the more behavioralist hand of Mr. Rothnie has steadied some of Professor
Korah's Chicago-school excesses of yore.
Finally, and not unimportantly, it should be noted that Exclusive Distribution is well produced, is accompanied by a useful
index, and contains the text of the relevant Block Exemption
29
Regulations28 and the Commission's Interpretive Notice.
It is perhaps at this time in the review that a criticism is
appropriate. I can think of only one. I have not as yet been
informed by the publishers of the estimated publication date of
the third edition.
27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that all
requests for exemption must be made to Commission).
28. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, at 309-50.
29. Id. at 351-65.

CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION. By Horacio A. Grigera Na6n.
Tiibingen: Mohr, 1992. xii + 337 pp. IBSN 3-16-145636-X.
DM 129.
Reviewed by Joseph T McLaughlin*
In Professor Grigera Na6n's latest work, Choice-of-law
Problems in International Commercial Arbitration,1 he attempts to
"analyze diverse aspects of international commercial arbitration so as to determine to what extent arbitral tribunals are
willing to perform the independent role ascribed to them by lex
mercatoria theoreticians, namely, the creation of an autonomous, anational and all-prevailing international commercial
law." 2 This introduction is as broad as the scope of international arbitration itself. Professor Grigera Na6n's lofty ambition is somewhat blunted, however, by the complexity of his
thoughts and ponderous writing style. While the title of the
book suggests a relatively discrete field of study, the author follows virtually every available detour onto complicated pathways of international law, policy, national court systems, and
the theoretical bases for that "Alice in Wonderland" doctrine
known as lex mercatoria.3
The book's strongest point is its description of choice-oflaw methodologies in various countries throughout the world.4
The author's analysis of these methodologies is quite extensive, spanning nearly 150 pages.5 Professor Grigera Na6n dissects the choice-of-law rules followed by some of the world's
major commercial powers including the United States, 6 the
United Kingdom,7 the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 and, cu* Partner, Sherman & Sterling, New York City; Adjunct Professor, Fordham
University School of Law; B.A. 1965, Boston College; J.D. 1968, Cornell Law School.
The author wishes to thank Schuyler Carroll, Esq. for his assistance in preparing this
Review.
1.HORACio A. GRIGERA NA6N, CHOICE-OF-LAw PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1992) [hereinafter CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS].
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 26-37.
4. Id. at 153-284.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 168.
7. Id.at 161.
8. Id. at 210.
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riously, Argentina.9 He continues with a discussion of the Socialist systems, from (former) Soviet jurisprudence to the law
of the People's Republic of China, particularly in the context of
their commercial relations with non-Socialist countries.' 0
In his quest to make the point that parties should not be
completely free to choose what law should apply to their commercial relations, Professor Grigera Na6n examines a number
of legal systems, including the law of the United Kingdom.''
He begins by noting that "[i]f taken literally, the proper law
doctrine [United Kingdom's prevailing choice-of-law doctrine]
would embody a recognition of the absolute freedom of the
parties to choose the applicable law even if the law so chosen
has no connection with the transaction or the dispute."' 2 The
author's tone suggests a certain distrust of such freedom. He
then analyzes the relevant U.K. law with a discussion of the
seminal case of Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. '" In Vita,
Lord Wright held the parties' express statement as to choiceof-law conclusive "provided the intention expressed is bonafide
and legal."' 4 Professor Grigera Na6n then points out that the
"bonafide and legal" requirement requires reference to a legal
order, possibly different than that chosen by the parties, in order to determine whether this requirement has been met.' 5
From this the author concludes that compulsory limitations
may be imposed on choice-of-law provisions in order to balance the interests of the contracting parties and "the concerns
of third parties and of communities connected with the transaction."16

Absent examples, which the author does not offer, it is difficult to criticize his abstract conclusions. Surely most members of the international legal community would agree that the
parties' contractual autonomy is limited in certain basic respects, for example, an agreement to bribe a public official is
9. Id. at 187.
10. Id. at 179-87.
11. Id. at 161-67.
12. Id. at 162.

13. Id. (citing Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., 1 All E.R. 513 (Privy
Council 1939).

14. Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., 1 All E.R. 513, 521 (Privy Council
1939).
15. CHOICE-OF-LAw PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 164.
16. Id.
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not enforceable. However, notwithstanding Professor Grigera
Na6n's fondness for abstract theories of choice-of-law limitations, the parties' choice-of-law should not be subjected to indiscriminate attack based upon unspecified "concerns of third
parties" if there is to be the necessary predictability in the international business community.
Professor Grigera Na6n, however, does point out a
number of ways in which the U.K. courts have restricted the
freedom of the contracting parties to choose the applicable
law. 7 One such example is the courts' policy of holding a contract invalid if it would be invalid under the law of the place of
performance when the place of performance is other than the
United Kingdom.1 8 The author concludes his discussion of the
U.K. choice-of-law approach by noting that it is "compatible
with emerging functionally-oriented methodologies in the
field."' 9
The author's analysis of the choice-of-law rules of the
United States includes a discussion of methodologies used to
choose the applicable law when the parties have not agreed on
what law would apply to any disputes. 20 This is the only instance where the author extensively discusses the issue of
choice-of-law in the absence of an expressed intent by the parties to the contract. Here, also, in discussing U.S. law, Professor Grigera Na6n makes what might well be his most telling
point: that each forum, in cases of true conflict with competing
policies of equal force, will apply its own law. 2 1 Such an observation should come as no surprise to international practitioners because judges and arbitrators are generally more familiar
with the law of their home state and thus more likely to apply
it, given any choice in the matter.
Professor Grigera Na6n also discusses the sharp contrast
between the classic socialist and capitalist positions on freedom to choose the applicable law:
It is in the sector of relations between socialist and capitalist enterprises where socialist laws allow greater freedom
17. Id. at 165-66.
18. Id. at 166.

19. Id. at 167.
20. Id. at 168.
21. Id. at 171.
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to contractual autonomy and choice-of-law stipulations because there is a general consciousness of the differences in
the social, political and economic systems to which the parties belong and the impossibility of insisting upon certain
conceptions and institutions of the internal law of socialist
nations in international transactions with capitalistic partners. In this sense, we seem to be confronted, although to a
greater degree, with the same phenomenon observed when
analyzing French and American law: the impossibility of extending the application of certain mandatory rules for domestic transactions to the sphere of international exchanges. This does not however imply a general willingness
of socialist parties to submit their transactions with capitalist counterparts to a foreign law. Rather, on the contrary,
they try to require through choice-of-law stipulations that
their own special legislation, practices, customs and usages
concerning international trade and economic relations govern their contracts.2 2
Thus, the prevailing (former) Soviet school of thought on
choice-of-law attempts to promote (former) Soviet commerce,
notwithstanding the fact that the legal analysis required may
not always remain consistent.23 Ironically, there appears to be
a strong similarity between (former) Soviet law and that of the
United States on choice-of-law. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that "parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit."' 4
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland StanfordJunior University, the Court focused upon the parties' freedom to contract with complete autonomy, including
agreements to submit any disputes to arbitration, to select a
specific forum for the arbitration or to allow some claims to be
decided by arbitration and some by judicial proceedings. 5
Ironically, (former) Soviet law also focuses upon the parties'
freedom to contract as to choice-of-law. As Professor Grigera
Na6n notes, however, this is true only because in most cases
22. Id. at 185.
23. Recent events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have outrun

the author's ability to keep his extensive discussion of "Socialist Systems" current.
This portion of the book already reads like a historical study rather than a topical
analysis.
24. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
25. Id.
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the parties have agreed that (former) Soviet law will apply and
the arbitrators believe this will benefit (former) Soviet commerce.2 6 The parties' freedom to contract would not be so
easily upheld in a case where a different forum or a different
law was chosen. This results in an inability to create an anational lex mercatoria or general principles of law superseding national law, as to which the author expresses his dissatisfaction.2 7
One might fairly question the support Professor Grigera
Na6n gives to either a lex mercatoria or a superseding general or
anational law. These two amorphous doctrines are more conceptual myth than reality. Both provide arguments for undermining clear, unambiguous contractual choice-of-law clauses
that, absent fraud, simply reflect the informed will of the parties. These mythical doctrines similarly allow one party to seek
to avoid the application of the law freely chosen, despite the
fact that the parties' intent was clearly expressed in their original contract.
It is precisely because the (former) Socialist systems have
allowed a lex mercatoria to develop that non-Socialist parties
can, or at least could in the past, freely contract with parties in
these countries, because in so doing the non-Socialist parties
could rely upon the contract's choice-of-law clause. This in
turn allows the parties to plan for disputes that may arise, to
consult legal advisors as to their obligations under the contract, and to take appropriate steps, if necessary, to protect
their rights under the law applicable to the contract. By contrast, if, in Professor Grigera Na6n's brave new world, the general principles of the lex mercatoria applied, the parties would be
severely disadvantaged because they could not accurately assess their legal rights and obligations nor predict their ultimate
exposure in the event of a dispute.
Professor Grigera Na6n neatly summarizes the choice-oflaw principles of Argentina, especially where the parties have
not selected the applicable law in their contract.2 8 In the case
of "contracts already performed or to be performed outside of
the place of contracting they will always be governed by the
26. CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 187.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 189-90.
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law of the place of performance. ' 29 The general rule in Argentina, however, is that the law of the place of concluding the
contract will govern contracts made outside Argentina.30 This
provision in essence allows, as the author later points out, the
parties to make a choice-of-law without including a specific
clause in the contract denominated as such.3 The author also
advocates a practical method of determining the applicable
place of performance.3 2 This method looks to the facts of each
contract as a whole on a case by case basis.3 3
After his discussion of Argentine choice-of-law principles,
Professor Grigera Na6n comments on the doctrinesfraude d la
loi and "abuse of rights," both of which limit the parties' autonomy in their choice-of-law. 4 Both doctrines are grounded
in the notion that there are general principles of morality and
justice that private parties cannot ignore when they enter into
contractual relations. Once again, it is difficult to criticize the
author's espousal of an abstract principle of general applicability, but it is difficult to assess the impact of such theories without specific examples which the author is not inclined to offer.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the parties are
granted fundamental freedom to choose the applicable law or
forum. 3 5 However, in some cases German courts have re-

quired some contact between the law and the transaction. 6
Like Argentine law, there are limits in Germany that require
the application of "public policy" and "lois de police" (international mandatory rules) limitations to the parties' freedom to
make a choice-of-law. 7 As Professor Grigera Na6n points out,
these restrictions in Germany are similar tofraude d la loi doctrine as well as the "abuse of rights" doctrine in other countries.3 8
Professor Grigera Na6n's discussion of French law in this
area seems somewhat repetitive of his prior analysis of the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See id. at 189-97.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 197-204.
See id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id.
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French choice-of-law rules. 39 In his analysis of a French statutory provision giving broad authority to the French courts to
review arbitral awards (both foreign and domestic), the author
notes that this scope of review will allow the parties or the arbitrators to choose lex mercatoria or general principles of law. 40
The author concludes that this freedom of choice "entitles arbitrators directly to designate the law they deem applicable
without having to refer to a particular body of private interna41
tional law which would justify that choice."
Such an argument does not support the freedom of the
parties to choose a particular law to govern their contract, nor
does it provide comfort to those who, quite rightly, seek some
certainty in their international commercial relationships.
Sadly, the author does not consider these critical points, but
rather resorts to the somewhat mythical lex mercatoria and general notions of "ordre public international" to explain his concept
of freedom to choose an applicable law. 4 2
After his discussion of choice-of-law principles, Professor
Grigera Na6n presents a section entitled "State Controls Over
Arbitral Agreements, Proceedings and Awards." '4 3 This section explores the degree of control that states retain over international arbitration within their territorial jurisdiction. Once
again, the analysis focuses upon a number of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
The author's discussion of U.S. law is particularly extensive and detailed, concluding with praise for the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., where the Court upheld the arbitration of an antitrust claim arising out of a transnational contract where the
arbitration was to be held in Japan.4 4 Professor Grigera Na6n
concludes that "the Supreme Court did weigh conflicting interests both for and against the arbitrability of certain disputes,
thus observing a functional choice-of-law methodology for
39. Id. at 155-61.
40. Id. at 229.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 230.
43. Id. at 219.
44. Id. at 235 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
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finding a principled solution for the specific issue at stake." 45
His discussion analyzes a number of other cases integral to the
development of U.S. law in this area, including M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 46 and Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co. 47
While Professor Grigera Na6n's analysis of choice-of-law
methodologies is extensive and detailed, his book suffers from
some important flaws. The author's style at times becomes intolerably obtuse and complex. The author often combines
many different and complicated ideas into a single sentence
that runs on, and on and on.
To a certain extent, this text suffers from a lack of focus on
a specific audience. The bulk of the book, an analysis of
choice-of-law methodologies, provides useful background on
the topic under the laws of major commercial countries. The
forty-four page Table of Citations4 is a useful collection of the
relevant literature, legislation, and arbitral awards, although
with two or three exceptions, the sources are all dated 1989 or
earlier. However, in the end the author gives limited assistance to one who is looking to the book for what its title suggests, i.e., solutions, or at least a discussion of, the practical
problems of choice-of-law in international commercial arbitration.49
The section of the book describing choice-of-law methodologies for international commercial arbitration is plagued
with textual problems which drive the reader to multiple foreign language dictionaries and, ultimately, to distraction. The
author makes extensive use of phrases and lengthy quotations
in a number of languages (e.g., Italian, German, Spanish, and
French) other than English. Although an international law text
should, by definition, be written for an international audience,
an English language book should not require a multi-lingual
translator to interpret the text for the presumably intended
English-speaking audience.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 240.
at 233 (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
(citing Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
at 293-337.
at 285-91.

